- Introduzione
- Islanda 1933-40
- Una strana invasione
- La Seconda Guerra in Islanda
- La seconda parte del conflitto
- La Repubblica d'Islanda
- Fine della neutralità (1946-47)
- Un precario equilibrio (1950-56)
- Carri armati in Ungheria scuotono l'artico
- Governo radicale e Cod Wars
- Il nuovo corso: 1959-1971
- Il governo radicale ci riprova
- I conservatori tornano al potere (1974-78)
- Gli anni Ottanta
- A cavallo del Millennio
Allegato L: The Security and Defence of Iceland at the turn of the century
Riportiamo di seguito i suggerimenti finali dell’Öryggismalàskyrsla (gruppo di lavoro ministeriale), presenti in un documento tipo "libro bianco" dal titolo The Security and Defence of Iceland at the Turn of the Century.
Tale documento venne presentato al ministro Halldor Asgrimsson nel febbraio 1999.
Principal Suggestions
The principal suggestions of the Working Group on the adaptation of defence and security arrangements are threefold:
A. Icelandic participation in the peacekeeping work of the international community should be made a regular feature of the work of the Icelandic Government in security affairs. Icelandic members of peacekeeping missions should, as applicable at any time, participate in peace and surveillance work conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, the OSCE and NATO, in co-operation with one or more co-operating states, including the Nordic countries.
B. Institutional and organisational measures should be taken by the Foreign Ministry to co-ordinate the participation of the Icelandic Government in peacekeeping work and take charge of the search for and appointment of appropriate employees and assume responsibility for their training and the terms of their employment. The relevant party should consult with other government agencies as required and participate in the preparation of the State Budget in as regards the participation.
C. Means should be sought for Iceland to take on a larger role, alone or in co-operation with other countries, in the national defence, i.a. in the area of law enforcement, measures against acts of terrorism, civil defence, rescue work, exercises and patrolling Icelandic waters. Steps must be taken to ensure the possibility of utilising the experience and expertise of Icelanders who have been involved in peacekeeping projects abroad, in the interest of national defence and security, on their return to Iceland.
Additional Suggestions
The Working Group makes the following additional suggestions on specific aspects of the security and defence policy:
1. Training and Expertise
Steps should be taken to make it possible for qualified individuals in Iceland to seek training and participate in colleges and courses on security and defence in individual member states, including the Nordic countries, and in the relevant fora of NATO. Steps should also be taken to study specifically how the Foreign Ministry and the University of Iceland could co-operate on ensuring that there is, at any time, available expert knowledge of matters involving security and defence.
Steps should be taken to make it possible for qualified individuals in Iceland to seek training and participate in colleges and courses on security and defence in individual member states, including the Nordic countries, and in the relevant fora of NATO. Steps should also be taken to study specifically how the Foreign Ministry and the University of Iceland could co-operate on ensuring that there is, at any time, available expert knowledge of matters involving security and defence.
2. Participation in the Work of NATO
The participation of the National Civil Defence of Iceland in the work of the Civil Emergency Planning Committee of NATO should be substantially strengthened, as the Committee has the important task of co-ordinating all civil emergency affairs concerning the member states in addition to providing a link with partnership states. This participation would make it easier for Iceland to prepare plans on reactions to crises and promote improved interoperability between Iceland and other countries in the conduct of exercises.
Steps must be taken to ensure continued participation by Iceland in the NATO Military Committee; Iceland was first represented on the Committee in 1998. The participation is useful to the Icelandic Government, i.a. in preparations for the peacekeeping measures of the Alliance outside the common territory of the member states, including the Balkan Peninsula, where Iceland is already a participant.
A study should be made of whether it is in the interest of Iceland to participate in the NATO Multinational Specialised Unit (MSU) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The purpose of the Corps is to react to unexpected developments which do not require military intervention, but which are beyond the control of unarmed police officers. Special training of police and security units in projects of this kind could be useful to the government in preventive measures against sabotage and terrorism.
A study should be conducted whether the time is ripe for Iceland to take a more active part in the work of the NATO Infrastructure Fund. Appropriations for construction projects have generally been reduced, and there are prospects of further reductions in investments in the Defence Base when the three new member states have joined the Alliance. The United States are now responsible for matters relating to Iceland in the Committee, but it is conceivable that it would serve Iceland's interests if it were represented on the Committee.
3. European Co-operation on Security and Defence
It would be advantageous to establish a link with the European Security and Defence Identity, whether through closer co-operation of the Western European Union or the merger of the latter with the EU in the near future. At the same time, Iceland's link with the foreign policy forum of the EU should be strengthened. A good occasion will arise to take up that issue in late 1999, when Finland takes over the Presidency of the European Union and the Amsterdam Treaty has taken effect.
In order to ensure that Iceland's participation in the co-operation on police matters and immigration control is effective on the basis of the Schengen Agreement, this should be followed up with a co-operation agreement with EUROPOL, which is a system of information exchange between the police authorities in the EU member states. The EUROPOL Convention has been ratified by all member states. A centralised communications centre on illegal substances has already began operation.
It would be advantageous to establish a link with the European Security and Defence Identity, whether through closer co-operation of the Western European Union or the merger of the latter with the EU in the near future. At the same time, Iceland's link with the foreign policy forum of the EU should be strengthened. A good occasion will arise to take up that issue in late 1999, when Finland takes over the Presidency of the European Union and the Amsterdam Treaty has taken effect.
In order to ensure that Iceland's participation in the co-operation on police matters and immigration control is effective on the basis of the Schengen Agreement, this should be followed up with a co-operation agreement with EUROPOL, which is a system of information exchange between the police authorities in the EU member states. The EUROPOL Convention has been ratified by all member states. A centralised communications centre on illegal substances has already began operation.
4 Nordic Co-operation on Security and Defence
A study should be made of the possibility of effective participation by Iceland in Nordic peacekeeping and rescue exercises with the participation of the Baltic States. Such exercises are now conducted under the auspices of Partnership for Peace. A special study should be made of whether it would be feasible for one or more Icelandic Coast Guard vessels to participate regularly in such exercises.
A study should be made of the possibility of effective participation by Iceland in Nordic peacekeeping and rescue exercises with the participation of the Baltic States. Such exercises are now conducted under the auspices of Partnership for Peace. A special study should be made of whether it would be feasible for one or more Icelandic Coast Guard vessels to participate regularly in such exercises.
5 Minesweeping
It is an urgent matter for the Icelandic Coast Guard to have the personnel and equipment available to deal with minesweeping, owing to Iceland's dependency on sea lines of communication. With the arrival of a new vessel for the Icelandic Coast Guard, new possibilities would arise of equipping vessels and train crews so as to render them useful in the event that mines are laid in the Icelandic economic zone.
It is an urgent matter for the Icelandic Coast Guard to have the personnel and equipment available to deal with minesweeping, owing to Iceland's dependency on sea lines of communication. With the arrival of a new vessel for the Icelandic Coast Guard, new possibilities would arise of equipping vessels and train crews so as to render them useful in the event that mines are laid in the Icelandic economic zone.
6 Organisation of Defence
The administrative organisation of security and defence should be thoroughly reviewed, i.a. for the purpose of ascertaining by what means the co-operation on security and defence, which currently fall variously under the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Justice, can be made more effective. Also, the role and composition of the Defence Committee should be reviewed with a view to reinforcing professional discussion of Icelandic defence matters.
The administrative organisation of security and defence should be thoroughly reviewed, i.a. for the purpose of ascertaining by what means the co-operation on security and defence, which currently fall variously under the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Justice, can be made more effective. Also, the role and composition of the Defence Committee should be reviewed with a view to reinforcing professional discussion of Icelandic defence matters.
7 Internal Security
An assessment needs to be made of the actual risks posed to Iceland, including the administrative system and infrastructure, by sabotage and terrorist acts, organised crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
It is important for the Icelandic Government to possess the greatest possible capacity of monitoring and reacting to the activities of extremist groups, in co-operation with other countries, and to continue the development of the Special Unit of the Police. Through Iceland's increased responsibilities in the international sphere, e.g. following the possible participation of Iceland in the United Nations Security Council in the future, the attention of disreputable political forces could be drawn to Iceland in a manner not familiar to Icelanders. Special regard must be taken of the internal security of Iceland in the foreseeable future.
An assessment needs to be made of the actual risks posed to Iceland, including the administrative system and infrastructure, by sabotage and terrorist acts, organised crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
It is important for the Icelandic Government to possess the greatest possible capacity of monitoring and reacting to the activities of extremist groups, in co-operation with other countries, and to continue the development of the Special Unit of the Police. Through Iceland's increased responsibilities in the international sphere, e.g. following the possible participation of Iceland in the United Nations Security Council in the future, the attention of disreputable political forces could be drawn to Iceland in a manner not familiar to Icelanders. Special regard must be taken of the internal security of Iceland in the foreseeable future.
