Storia Islandese / Iceland, History Of

In Iceland, Great Britain was operating a large number of men and units, but as the months were passing by, the outcome of the conflict seemed to be uncertain; the Dunkerque evacuation, the collapse of France, the entrance of Italy in the conflict and the german military success in North Africa and Balkans put the Germany in advantage, even if England could still count on efficient defences for the motherland.

In 1940 the USA were still formally out of the conflict, but thir policy was ambiguous; in the biennium 1935-37 had been launched a legislative package for neutrality, forbidding the US to have commerce with any belligerant state. The invasion of Poland opened a wide debates in the session of the US parliament and on newspaper, and President Roosvelt in person asked for the abrogation of neutrality law (which was limiting the US foreign policy) and for the adoption of the so-called “cash and carry” law, to give the democracies in war to access to the american supplies.
In summer 1940 american voters were called to elect the President to guide them in time of troubles; democrats, in contrast with the tradition of discouraging the third election of a candidate, confirmed Roosvelt again for the White House, and he was elected.

Little after the German occupation of Denmark, the president stated that Greenland, although a danish colony, belonged to the western emisphere, and she will be considered as included in the so-called Monroe Doctrine (from Presidente James Monroe, 1758-131, the attitude of the United States in foreign policy to block any influence of the european powers in the new world) (61). The president did not cited Iceland explicitly, but the region could be considered as a strategic unit.
 
The problem of the participation of the United States in WWII has been long discussed by the historians. From a formal point of view, americans declared war after Pearl Harbour attack. However, Rossvelt policy well before this accident can be considered at least as “antineutral” (62): the so-called lease and loan law (62) gave Britain the possibility to have continuous providings; this law was extended to Soviet Union; seizure of properties of the Axis countries and even the delivery to England of 50 naval destroyers, as payment for the rent of british naval base in Terranova and British Guyana.
North Atlantic was part of the anti neutral attitude.
Britain had problems in maintaing people and meanings in Iceland, and the Canadian option was not a solution. Churchill wanted to involve the americans in the defence of Iceland, as a crucial step:

“The only thing that matters in for the United States to arrive in Iceland – as soon and as many as possible. Wheter we stay or go, in whole or part, is altogheter secondary; and indeed i think it is preferable that the two should be on the island togheter for some time” (64)

The american president, in a confidential meeting with british ambassador Lord Halifax the 28th of May 1941, suggested the possibility of an american partecipation in the icelandic theatre. Actually, the US had already the first marine brigade ready to occupy the Azores Islands, in case of a german invasion in Portugal. This garrison could be easily redirected to Iceland in few days. This disposal of the american president came after several discussions of the military chiefs, who had already drafted the basic line of a plan (65), and the moment seemed to be profitable: the 25th of March Berlin declared the icelandic waters as a war zone, it the attempt to expand the range of the offensive actions. But in the meanwhile, the british occupation of Iceland was proceeding well, with no significant problems, and many infrastrutcures were already in service; preliminary diplomatic contacts at the end of 1940 seemed to be positive (66), and just few weeks later Hitler decided to move the troops in the East against Soviet Union (67).

The plan was carried on, but the United States made clear that they had no intention to invade Iceland unsolicited (the way the britons did), but they pretended a formal invitation by icelandic authorities. London would have preferred a direct action “we come and then we deal”, but Roosvelt was firm in this position because of the internal public opinion, and also not to give any propaganda matter to the Axis forces.
The 24th of june 1941 the british embassy received the order to make diplomatic pressure to have this invitation, and the ambassador Smith was in trouble: the anglo-icelandic relations were stable and balanced, so the icelanders saw no reason to change a good guest with an unknown one; moreover, for the many time stated strategic role of Iceland, they considered improbable the leaving of the britons (and the subsequent economic advantages) if they would had not accepted the americans.

Negotiations secretly went on between the consul and the first minister Jònasson. London considered crucial the good outcome of the request, and Smith at the end was successful. But the icelanders imposed many conditions: in a memorandum of 15 points, to be signed by US and British authorities (68), they asked: immediate withdrawal after the war, no interferences in domestic affairs, favourable trading agreements, recognition of icelandic sovereignity as an indipendent state and, to England, the release of all icelandic prisoners.
 
The explicit guarantee of the support to the icelandic struggle for indipendence was a key ponit: many members of parliament had spent much of their prestige in the process to dissolve the danish Union (69), and the inexpert parlamentarians begane to submit long term requests.

The 1st july 1941 the agreement was ready, but it had to pass the ratification of the Parliament. Significantly, the first US marine arrived the 7th july, while the Alþing session was held the 10th and 11th.
 
Gisli Sveinsson, spokeman of the right wing of the conservative party was quite skeptical about the analysis of the international situation given by the government, which required the intervent of the Great Powers in Iceland. Also the progressive Hannesson Palms considered highly risky to abandon the neutral policy. Communist members raised consideration of different kind: if the situation was so dangerous that Iceland needed to call the powers, thus also the Soviet Union had to partecipate to this internationa mission.

The supporters of the plan based their answers on a wide range of consideration: USA, as the most powerful country, could better protect Iceland; the national indendence issue was formally accepted; the trade agreements were favourable; and, with reference to the neutrality issue, Americans were not a belligerant country, so the neutrality policy would not have been interrupted (70).
The ballots reported 39 yes, 3 no, 6 abstainers. The negative votes came from the communists, whose petition for USSR was rejected.
 
The press accepted the line of the Parliament (71), agreeing on the fact that even if no one was enthusiastic with the situations, at least there were advantages. The same prime minister Jònasson exposed from the pages of the party newspaper that the national interests were put on top of the agenda.

Therefore Iceland accepted to grant the United States the role of defenders, after a real negotiation. Technically, the agreement was a political thightrope walking: Iceland would have been under the occupation of two states, one neutral, the other one at war against a fourth, with which Iceland and USA were formally in peace.

The agreement did not mean the entrance in war of the United Stats, as they formally were covering a defensive role. The US army would have taken the possession of the bases, maintaining them fully operatives, while RAF and Royal Navy, in collaboration with the US forces, were continuing their missions.
The agreements met the need of every partner: England could relieve forces from a second line theatre without modify the presence in the region, and even more important they brought US closer to the conflict; Winston Churchill commented the event as “one of the most important thing happened from the beginning of the war” (72).
The icelanders, that could not arrest the militarization of the Island, forced the counterparts to accept a long list of conditions, from economic priviliges to the indipendence at the end of the war, with the maximum profit.
The US six months before Pearl Harbour came to Iceland after a specific invitation, avoiding any image problem, and could count on a safe zone (Greenland was also under control) in the North Atlantic.
The germans were furious but impotent: the german foreign minister Ribbentropp commented the American action as an act of war, in a telegram to the Japanese government (74), and also Hitler commented it as an “american provocation”. On the other sice, Churchill was waiting the accident between the german and the american fleet, to have the latter finally in.

In the while, in Iceland there was a constitutional changing which could gfacilitate the dialogue. The progressive Hermann Jònasson was in charge as prime minister since 1934, but the conservatives of the Indipendence Party were gaining consensus, and introduced a reform of the electoral district. At that time, the progressives were stronger in the countryside, and the counting system adopted, while the city were under rapresentated (75). Two parliament votes were needed (76)to approve the new system, and at the end the conservatives made it and could take the leadership of the parliament at the subsequent elections, with the Progressive Party as the second force (with a loss of 25% of the seats from july to october 1942, when the new electoral law came into force).
The Social Union Party also enjoyed positive effects from the new system, from 3 seats in 1937 to 6 in 1942, up to the jump to 10 seats in october 1942 (18.5% of the votes). Even if the base of the SUP was constituited by socialists and trade unions affiliates, the leadership was strongly communist (78), which create a vivid debate where, traditrionally, social democrats were more radicated.
The communits were skillful in taking advantage from the contrasts of other leaders: often Òlafur Thors, the charismatic leader of the conservatives, and Hermann Jònsson, the chiefs if the Progressives (respectively with 38% and 27% of the votes in 1942), were not able to make a coalition, and the SUP was often the hold of the balance (79).
Beyond the contrasts, the icelandic domestic policy had not many  critic points: Soviet Union, USA and UK were allied, so there were not ideologial barriers with the communists being the third political party, and the presence of the soldiers was well accepted and useful to the economic wealth of the nation.

Note al testo:
61) Riportato da Bjòrn Bjarnason, Iceland's Security Policy: Vulnerability and Responsability, in Deterrence and Defense in the North, 1985.

62) Riprendo qui la definizione data da A. Nevins e H. Steele Commager in Storia degli Stati Uniti, Einauidi, Torino 1960.

63) Questa legge stabiliva che gli USA potessero prestare o affittare qualunque materiale, militare o di altro genere, a qualsiasi nazione la cui difesa avesse importanza vitale per il paese.

64) Nota di W. Churchill per il generale Ismay, 4 luglio 1941. Per gentile interessamento dell'Istituto Winston Churchill, Washington (via internet, www.Winstonchurchill.org).

65) B. Groendal, cit. p. 30. In un incontro segreto tenutosi a Washington, i generali britannici ed americani studiarono un primitivo assetto di guerra se e quando gli Usa fossero entrati nel conflitto. Tale piano di massima, noto come ABC-1, prevedeva il passaggio dell'Islanda agli americani.

66) D. Nuechtelein, Iceland reluctant ally, Connecticut 1960, p. 26.
 

67) Il fatto che i servizi segreti britannici sapessero dell'attacco all'Unione Sovietica è ipotesi accettata da molti storici (Werth, Storia dell'Unione Sovietica; Gaeta Villani Petraccone, Storia Contemporanea). Questa informazione poteva essere di ulteriore conforto al presidente americano sull'opportunità del momento.
68) Per il testo completo cfr. United States foreign policy, 1931-1941, US Department of State, Washington 1943, p. 151.
 

69) E. Loftsson, The Disguished Threat, in Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. 10, num. 3, 1985.

70) Per i dibattiti parlamentari, cfr. Alþingistiðindi, 1941.

71) Il Þjoðviljinn era stato già chiuso.

72) Bjòrn Bjarnason, Iceland's Security Policy: Vulnerability and Responsability, in Deterrence and Defense in the North, Norwegian University Press, Oslo 1985, p.134.

73) Cfr. E. Lofsson, The Disguished Threat, cit. A seguito dell'occupazione danese del '40 l'Alþing varò una dichiarazione in cui affermava che il monarca danese non era nelle condizioni oggettive di esercitare le funzioni stabilite dall'Atto d'Unione, e che quindi queste venivano assunte da un reggente eletto dal parlamento. Per questo incarico venne eletto Sveinn Bjornrsson, già ambasciatore a Copenaghen, che diverrà il primo presidente della repubblica islandese.

74) W. Shirer, The rise and fall of the Third Reich, Londra 1960, p. 881.

75) Per uno studio del sistema politico islandese cfr. anche D. Nuechterlein, Iceland Reluctant Ally, cit.

76) La legge islandese prevede che modifiche alla costituzione passino al vaglio di una prima votazione, il parlamento viene sciolto e la modifica deve passare anche di fronte al nuovo parlamento; in caso di parere positivo si passa ad una nuova tornata elettorale a regole modificate.

77) Mi si consenta di usare la sigla inglese (SUP, da Socialist Unity Party) in luogo di quella, cacofonica, italiana.

78) T. Whitehead, The Ally, cit. p.15.

79) Per il quadro delle elezioni vedi Allegato A (risultati elettorali '34 -'42).