Storia Islandese / Iceland, History Of

Diplomacy, during the occupation, was taken in great care by british authorities: it was not just a matter of image, but also practical, to maintain friendship relations with the locals, passive resistance and delays.
General Harry Curtis recognized the importance of this balance in a short letter to General Robert Haining:

“Political questions are both numerous and intricate. The government just wants nobody here, including Denmark. They are determined in no way to compromise their neutrality... The people can be a real help – but if against usm the situation would be intolerable and probably dangerous”

The icelandic government firmly confirmed the policy of neutrality, even if, at that time, reduced to a formality, and ambassador Smith was in the middle of interests quite difficult to meet. Government avoid any act of active collaboration; for example, the british had to pay telephone bills just like privates, or even contracts between british and locals were subject to normal law, with no direct interference by the government, which never could apper as involved in any way.
Just like the other before him, ambassador Smith had to admit that icelanders, stubborn by nature, did not understand the real reason of the war, and many of them were still of the opinion that they could have lived in peace for all the conflict, if the britons had not arrived. Anyway, Smith was optimist: a good economic approach could be successful, and icelanders were sufficiently pragmatic to find the advantages of the situation.
In 1940 United Kingdom bought the whole stock of icelandic harring and ovine meat (52) at extremely favourable prices, in some cases up to four time the pre-war level. Agreements were also signed for year 1941 (but at a normalized level), and the value of icelandic exportation made a huge step ahead, from 2.200.000 pounds in 1938 to 7.250.000 pounds in 1941.
The abnormal expansion had some negative effects: strong inflation, excess of currency, bigger salaries without enough goods in the market to spend them; but in a depressed economy the advantages were much higher and the government could declare the full employement of the active population.
Even if the englishmen were not simple benefactors (they imposed a suspension of commerce with other european states, did not permit the conversion of pounds reserves in dollars and could not provide all the importation requested), the war economy was a paradox in Iceland: while in the rest of Europe it meant restrictions, in Iceland it was a turning point to the wealth and richness of the country. In so considering, the reluctant behaviour of the icelanders could sound inadequate; but for those who live their life in a big european nation, always used to revalotion and changing, it is very hard to have the right idea of icelandic mentality. A good observer, admiral Darymple-Hamilton reassumed the situation in a note to the Admiralty:  
“To the outsider it appears that the icelanders are rapidly becoming bewildered by a situation that is beyond their power to grasp. Fro 1,000 years the have lived a hard life in complete indipendence. Their wants have been few, but it has always taken all thier time to supply them. Agricultur and fishing have been their industries and such culture as they have built up for themselves was based on music and painting coupled with an admiration for their own past history. They are ostinated and self-opinionated people and resent interference from outsiders. In fact they are intensely peninsular. They are naturally kind-hearted and hospitable and fond of children, animals, brids and flowers. Up to the war they wer simple people living in a world of their own. This has now completely changed. Owing to the occupation, which has brought full employment at good wages and the high prices obtainable for icelandic fish, money is plentiful. Luxury of all kinds from high class motor cars to fashionable clothing, hiterto quite unknown to icelanders, are being imported. There is a rush of population to Reykjavik from outlying districts; farm labour is scarsce and there is a general tendency to softer living and appreciation of luxury. (54)
Under the guide of Howard Smith the British Embassy in Reykjavik made any effort to establish a convenient collaboration, with the direct help of the icelandes: many joint commissions were created to discuss problems in a equity basis and prevent complains to become hard protests. That was the case, for exemple, of the commission to fastly refund damages and accidents, and for road maintance as road were heavily stressed by military transportations (55), and even a commettee for demolition and rebuilding of houses interested by the enlargment of Reykjavik airoport. Those commission, often with an icelandic majority and with an adequate budget (56), were anotehr proof of the practical approach of the icelanders, who resisted the temptation to close themselves to the outsiders and opted for collaboration.
While Smith was weaving his diplomatic strategy, also the soldiers had their role in maintaining a friendship cohabit, and discipline was taken in great care by the officials. The promise not to interferre could not to be maintained, and icelanders had to suffer some limitations: radio on boats were sealed (57), off limits areas were established, prohibition of fishing near the military zones and so on.

The presence of 28,000 young foreigners in a country of 120.000 people was a cause of friction, nevertheless there are almost no records of major accidents (58). Verbal provocations or occasional fights were under a tollerable level. In that years in iceland were about 30.000 young girls, but the presence of the british soldiers almost instantly doubled the numbers of young men. General Curtis paid great attention to this, imposing to his men a rigorous code of behaviour (59).
Beside to lee pleasant episode there were also moments of friendship: the band of the Royal Regiment of Canada every week performed a concert broadcasted via radio, and every time to concert ended with the Icelandic National Anthem. During Christmas the army organized many events for children with Santa Klaus and gifts, and street parades of the colorful scottish regiments. The 146° brigades, in Akureiry, gave as present a precious candle holder in brass to the local cathedral, still today proudly exposed.

There were accidents which upset the icelanders, the the deportation of citizens to England under the accuse of “subversive actions”. In september 1940 two young men from Akureyri and Reykjavik were found in possession of long range radios used to communicate with germany regularly. Legally, the two guys were not breaking any icelandic law, so the icelandic authority had little to do. General Curtis was much more direct, put the youngs under arrest and sent them to England.
It was quite a shock, an reaction on press were vivid: 4th September 1940 paper Morgunblaðid wrote: “English are interferring in our lives and behaviours, and this is contrary to the assurance given to our government the day they arrived”. Also the Timinn (newspaper of the progressive party, at that time leadring the parliament) was quite skeptical and criticic, but also published an interview with the foreign minister Stefàn Stefànsson to calm down the question: the dream of those youngs, who dreamed for Iceland a future of barbarism and dictatorship, was deplorable and shameful (6 september).
Social democrats newpaper Alþydublaðid, in the editorial of the 5 september, adopted a very logic approach: every action to facilitate an invasion of the country was to be considered contrary to the interest of the nation. So, at the present status quo, any action against the britons could results in an action against Iceland. The british soldiers were forced to act (creating a diplomatic affairs) because of the weakness and indecision of the government.
Much more critic and totally on a different line was the communist newspaper Þjoðviljinn. It was always the most problematic voice for the british, also because ideologically in an anticapitalist and ultranationalist position. From that pages often arose protests and hints, like that one, published the 17th september:
“Even if many of them are acceptable persons, we all well know that among them there is also the trash of the miserable capitalistic society, men turned to beasts by a perverse education and an sick society. Those are the men who seduct our women, and even children, and spread venereal desease”.

The anti british activity of the Þjoðviljinn was not only limited to articles. In the occasion of a strike of workers for better salaries, they distribute flyers with a message for british soldiers: “do not steal work to icelander workers” (January 1941). To british ears it was sounding as an appeal for munity, and both ambassador Smith and General Curtis could not ignore it; they decided to let the parliament making the first move, to test their force. The trial against the newspaper closed with some convinctions (even if light ones), also for the editors; one of them was the communist deputy Einar Òlgeirson, who, granted with immunity, had to pass the three month house arrest after the legislation. Probably the british decided not to act directly because any action against Einar could seem a violation of the Parliament, which one of the symbol the britons decided not to touch from the very beginning of their arrival.
Einar (60), defended by immunity and the situation around him, decide to repeat the provocations: the 7th of april he started a strong campaign for a strike in Reykjavik airport, again asking the british soldiers to back the icelanders. This time Curtis was much more determined: 27th of aprile the newspaper was closed, and the editors (Einar included) were deported to Englad. Ambassador Smith tried to explain the accident from the british point of view, but even if Þjoðviljinn was a small newspaper selling 1500 copies per day, the editor was a member of parliament and its closure was not determined by an icelandic law; the government presented a formal complain.
Comments on the press were differents: newspaper Morgunblaðid, which never would have thought to spend an arcticle in favour of the communists, clearly stated that freedom was not anymore in Iceland. Newspaper Visir called the governement protest as the stronger diplomatic crisis between the two countries.
The Alþydublaðid once again more was balanced: the fault for the accident had to be shared in three. The britons, for their hateful action, the Government for the weakness in anticipating the british reaction, the Þjoðviljinn for their mutiny appeal minig the military projects.
Three months later Einar was released and came back, but General Curtis did not give license for the newspaper to reopen. But in the meanwhile something had happened: a new communist newspaper was on the market, the Nyatt Dagblad, but now the Germany were attacking the Soviet Union, and suddenly the britons, from aggressive invaders, became allied, blamed for not sufficiently help Moscow. Far far wawy from the ideologistic slogans of few months before.

A crucil step in anglo icelandic relation was the visit to the country made by Winston Churchill the 16th august 1941. On the way back to England after a meeting with Roosvelt in Canada, where they signed the “Atlantic Paper”, Churchill stopped in Reykjavik. Received with all the honours by authorities and population, he reviewed troops and made a speech in the Parliament (Alþinghus). He renewed the gratitude to icelanders and the willing of England to cause as little disturbance as possible but, above all, he said “we and the americans will make sure that Iceland will enjoy the absolute freedom” after the end of the war. For icelanders that sounded as the oath of the withdrawn of the soldiers and the support of icelandic indipendence process.
The visit was a great diplomatic success, a kind of spiritual bomb: the prestige of Churchill was enormous, and for the first time Icelanders were treated seriuosly, not like an almost unknown colony.
The press emphasized the event with vivid tones. The Timinn spoke of “a memorable day for history of Iceland (...). the most influential person of the British Empire has repeated tha England and United States will guarantee full indipendence to our country, at the end of the war”.
The Morgunblaðid was equally enthusiastic: “It is true that Iceland is an occupied country, but we must remember the reason of the occupation: the fight for the freedom of the small states”.

Note al testo:
51) Lettera archiviata presso il British War Office, documento num. 106/3042 e riportata da Bittner, The Lion, nel prologo (The British view of Iceland).

52) T. Whitehead, The ally who came in from the cold, Reykjavik, 1998, p. 13.

53) Secondo W. C. Chamberlain, in Economic Development of Iceland, Columbia University Press 1947, l'intervento inglese cadde in un momento particolarmente critico. Senza le spese sostenute dalle forze militari, e priva di margini di miglioramento difficilmente l'Islanda avrebbe potuto sostenere il debito stero e pagare le importazioni nel quinquenni 40-44, periodo in cui invece essa passò dalla condizione di debitore quasi insolvente a sostanziale creditore.

54) Rapporto all'Ammiragliato britannico, documento num. 199/671, da Bittner, The Lion, cit. p. 12.

55) Fra tutti, questo fu probabilmente il comitato che si radunò più volte in quanto i trasporti militari misero a dura prova le infrastrutture viarie del paese.

56) Le richieste di rimborso che superavano una certa soglia passavano ad un ufficio preposto a Londra, ma ciò accadde raramente.

57) Se i sigilli fossero stati rotti, l'equipaggio ne avrebbe dovuto rispondere; le radio potevano essere usate solo per questioni di emergenza o di servizio giustificato.

58) Nel rapporto annuale del 1940 Smith registra solo due casi, l'aggressione del segretario dell'ammiraglio ad un ballo e l'arresto di un gruppo d'islandesi che rifornivano clandestinamente alcune truppe di alcolici.

59) Impose alla truppa di rispettare i "Dieci comandamenti del soldato in Islanda" in cui includeva, tra l'altro, quello di trattare le donne islandesi come sorelle o come mogli.

60) Circa il 90% dei cognomi islandesi sono patronimici, derivando dal nome del padre (in rari casi da quello della madre) più il suffisso -son per i maschi e -dottir per le femmine; per questo motivo gli islandesi sono soliti usare il nome e non il cognome quale nominativo principale.