Storia Islandese / Iceland, History Of

The british admiralty had a different view from the army’s one. The Navy had no intention to spend many meanings and units in Iceland. This different approach was based on the much higher consideration the Navy had of Scapa Flow (Orkney Islands) and Shetlands; taking possesion of Iceland and Faroer granted England the superiority on the sea, and a German blitz in the region was unlikely. Actually, for Germany Iceland could represent an easy target only if they could overwhelm the british fleets; in other words operation Ikarus (the seizure of Iceland), could not be possible before Operation Sea Lion (invasion of England). (48)

Curiously, Army and Navy had different readings also regarding minor facts: for General Curtis, winter had to be considered a risky season, for the arctic night, which could be hyde an enemy manouvre. On the contrary, the marine force was of the opinion that the instability of the weather could represent one more reason for the enemy to abandon a plan of invasion. (49)

Since the beginning, a staff of officials of the Royal Navy collaborated with General Lammie, and the 1st July 1940 Admiral Scott was ready to establish a Navy head quartier. The first decision was to operate in Hvalfjordur, 15 miles north of Reykjavik: a deep fjord, not exposed to streams and quite easy to defend.
The fleet assigned to Iceland in this moments was composed by 14 antisub boats, 6 minesweepers and a dozen of sentinel boats, all scattered in several ports; but the Battle of the Atlantic was not yet in its crucial days, and most the units were still “non combatants”.  Hvalfjordur was equipped with passive defences (anti sub nets, mines) and artillery, while the works to prepare an ammo depot, water supplying and fuel station (the latter thanks to the famous american “lease and loan” law) were carried on.
 
Also the Aviation, in this first period, did not express the same view of the Army: the army would have preferred a tactical aerial defence (coast surveillance and intercepts), while the RAF was more favorable to a strategic aerial defence (escort, long range surveillance, antisub warfare). The two roles are very different, not only for the aircraft used, but also because the first one is in partnership with the army, the second one with the army).
The Air Ministry resolved the issue pragmatically: a good cover of the zone would have demanded polyvalent a air force poured them and, but at the moment a means diversion was not possible, above all hunting, from the madrepatria. Not hardly the aerial field of Kaldadharnes had been ready, the Air Ministry was disposed to send the 98 RAF Squadron, 18 light bombers “Fairey Battle”, in order to meet to the requirements of the army. The aircrafts were not the best for the role assigned, but from the beginning of september 1940 Curtis had its long desired aerial coverage (50).

The Army established its General Head Quartier in Àrtun, at that time a small village outside Reykjavik, nowadays a district of the Capital, with representatives of RAF and Royal Navy, which had their centres in the city. In case of german attack, the command would have been unified under Curtis authority.

The tactical defence of Iceland lasted for the rest of the year, while from the first half of 1941, Iceland became a strategic base for long range operation, and new units and meanings were deployed. Finally, 19th march, RAF Captain Primrose )a strong personality, sometime in contrast with Curtis) open a new and indipendent head quartier, to organize the operation of english squadrons, Royal Canadian and some norwegian pilot. The passage to strategic operations signed an offensive phase in the struggle for North Atlantic, from summer 1941.
 

Note al testo:
 
48) La questione non era però così semplice: l'intelligence riteneva che un piano dettagliato d'invasione dell'Islanda fosse stato redatto, nei minimi particolari, nel quartier generale prussiano di Wolfschanze; quando le attività tedesche nelle acque islandesi raggiunsero il momento di massima intensità (prima metà del '41), i rapporti dello spionaggio in Norvegia furono più d'una volta allarmanti. Cfr B. Groendal, From neutrality, cit.

49) Bittner, The Lion, cit. p. 62.
 
50) Tra l'aprile ed il dicembre del 1941 anche una squadriglia di 6 intercettori Hurricane servì in Islanda, sempre nell'ottica della difesa tattica.