Storia Islandese / Iceland, History Of

Brigate commander Lammie soon developed his troops among the sensitive objectives, but it resulted in a dispersion and quickly he forwarded requests for reinforcements (44). The threat of a german landing was not the sole worry, and the Consul Smith well knew it: a single act of retaliation made by the Germany, like an air raid over Reykjavik, could heavely damage the little capital and dissolve the friendly partnership, so the british forces had the moral duty to protect properly the icelanders from the moment the involved them, directly or indirectly, in the conflict.

The War Cabinet made to know that there was no possibility to redirect british troops to second line theatre like Iceland (on the contrary, plans for an evacuations, in case of desperate defense of the motherland, were already prepared). An embarrasing accident revealed the lack of control the british had on Iceland: the first of June rumors announced the landing of a german force on the eastern coasts. The news was false, but joke, false alarm or strategy of the tension, the british soldiers could not refute nor confirm for days. Only the area od Reykjavik could be said effectively under control.

In the while, the 18th of may, just a week after the invasion, the english government asked Canada to partecipate in the struggle for North Atlantic. The first minister of Canada, mr. King, expressed to the War Cabinet Committee the willing of his country to assist Great Britain, but the good attitude was not sufficient to resolve every problem. Specifically, the British War Cabinet wanted the Canadian to take possession of Iceland, in order to release the Lammie’s 147° Brigade and move it back in the 49° Division. But Ottawa, which already had her Second Division serving in England, was disappointed by this request: Canadians wanted their soldiers in England or at home, while Iceland was not even part of the Commonwealth. The canadian public opinion was also worried about its western coasts (46): Japan Empire was getting aggressive (in a little time it would have signed a Trilateral Pact with Germany and Italy), and there was a strong Japanese community in the British Columbia.

At the end, Canadian Government partially accepted the requests: they sent the Royal Regiment of Canada, plus an infantry brigade. The contingent, called “Z Force” , was not to substitute the briitish, but to reinforce the garrison in Iceland. In July other canadian troops joined, Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, The Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa and the Essex Scottish but the Canadian government was not satisfied with this solution and made clear that these arrangments had to be considered as temporary.
Sir Winton Churchill, first minister and president of the War Cabinet, decided to accept the canadian objections: 16th October the 70° british brigade was sent to replace the canadians (which remained in Iceland with the Camero Highlanders, replaced only in 1941 for technical problems). Churchill decided so on the base of simple considerations: canadians were unsufficiently trained and their contribution was not crucial for the war; probably, after “baptisme in action” the canadians would have been more firmly with England. And, above all, Churchill knew that the turning point of the war was not the Canada.

However, the continuous demands for reinforces had their effects: the 27th June, 1940, the 146° brigade of General Harry Curtis arrived in Iceland, to take over the operations, with engeneering support.
 
At this point, the british garrison was sufficient to carry out the tasks required by the “first phase”: from the summer of 1940 there were not major changing (excepted the above mentioned 70° brigade turn over) (47). The army did not stop worring about a german counterinvasion, and other requests for more artillery, or a stronger activity of aviation and navy, were often forwarded. But the dilemma was always the same: redirecting meanings and men to Iceland meant to weaken other theatres, and such requests were often ignored.

The army had also the logistic task to create infrastructures, often from nothing. Iceland could not provide a strong working force (approx 2,500 workers, discontinuously), and 250 workers were even imported from Faroer. London therefore asked the army to take large part of the work, although General Curtis knew that transforming soldiers in workers was not the best for their morale. Anyway, they had no choice, and their first duty was to prepare the landing grounds of Kaldadharnes (30 km south east of the capital) and Reykjavik; even if to a minimum efficency profile, the works were completed, rispectively, on may 30th and july 31st 1940.

Note al testo:
 
44) Vennero designate quattro zone principali: Reykjavik nel sud ovest, Akureyri nel nord, Seydhisfjordur nell'est e Hunafloi nel nord ovest. Circa due terzi delle forze vennero impiegate nella capitale, Akureyri ricevette buona parte del rimanente e le altre zone solo piccoli distaccamenti.

45) D. Bittner, The Lion, cit., p. 58.

46) Una invasione tedesca del Canada era praticamente impossibile, e gli Usa avrebbero necessariamente reagito, ma la straordinaria efficacia della Wermacht riuscì a infondere negli avversari quella che Donald Bittner chiama "the Germans-can-do-anything mentality".

47) In pratica solo nel giugno del '41, a poche settimane dall'arrivo degli americani, il gen. Curtis ottenne altri rinforzi per proteggere la linea Reykjavik - Akureyri.