Storia Islandese / Iceland, History Of

At the first hours of the dawn, transport ships entered in Reykjavik harbour; although this kind of event was considered expectable, local population for hours did not know if ships were bringing british or german soldiers.
The commander of the operation was colonel Sturges, with a garrison of 40 ufficials and 775 soldiers fro Royal Navy “Brigade 101”, with the support of artillery and a small group of Intelligence agents. The orders were to occupy and defend the area of Hvalfjourdur (a natural harbour near Reykjavik, considered suiteble to establish a naval base) and the few landing grounds of the island. The decision of the occupation was taken on the base of logistic consideration: according to Secretary of the British Admiralty, Faroer Islands could not support a major naval base in the North Atlantic. Moreover, in case of german invasion, the british would have necessarily to conterattack, tranforming the island in a new battelfield (33).
In the need to establish a military infrastructure in the North, as well as taking possesion of a key point in the region, the british could follow two strategies: a traditional diplomatic channel with icelandic authority to find the best possible collaboration (as it was made in economics, to exclude Germany from icelandic trading), or an unsolicited, unexpected move. Both of the options had fors and againsts: negotiations risked to be slows and inefficients, also for the will of Iceland to stress with the position of strict neutrality. But an invasion could result in a loss of prestige and in a comparison of the british to the german nazis, acting the same way. The decision was taken the 1st of May, when Churchill in person informed the War Cabinet that the invasion option had to be preferred. In fact, Iceland never would have grated permission for a military mission in its territory, so a diplomatic negotiation very likely would have been resolved in a loss of time, and in an advatage for Germany.
In the first months of the war, German military apparatus was giving the impression of omnipotence, with a series of spectacular military successes, and this psycological attitude (the so called germans-can-do-everything mentality)pressed the british to a direct action. The diplomatic staff in Reykjavik was also renewed, as Mr. Smith was nominated as Consul, with a new and vital task: to avoid any direct opposition by the icelandic government, and to present the british military action not as a act of war against an indipendent country, but as an act of protection for the liberty of the country against Germany, who was demostrating an aggressive and unloyal policy.
Day 10th of May was a day of paradox: nearly nobody of the soldier had visited the land before, and informations were little and inaccurate among the troop. And the locals also did not know where the newcomers came from (34). Few days before departing, lieutenant Douglas Haig Thomas was asked to prepare an informative file: he described a land of lava desert and moss, barren territories and few villages; population, in spite of what commonly trusted, was not eskimos but europeans. The lieutenant included two maps, one of the country and one of the city of Reykjavik, by that time the dark capital of a poor state, made of many single small houses in galvanized iron panels, with no architectural building except for the new University. The landscape around showed no trees, like a wide sterile area.
Many of those who served in Iceland have left trace of their first impressions in war diaries. Colonel Wilson, the same day of disembarkations, so wrote:

“… The time passed and to the 4:00 of the mattino we headed towards the bay of Reykjavik. The country seemed collinoso and wild, in single distance snow mountains covered (…). The air was cold and clear, and it could be seen to a great distance” (35).
An official of the RAF instead described the first impressions in these terms:
“We stopped ourselves on the dock in order to study the part of Reykjavik that was looked at, and we found it ugly, pebbly, empty, inospita them. Powder of washes anywhere… is prayed a little in order of rain and the powder becomes mud” (36).

After a while, soldiers’ diaries bring back more clement impressions: although Reykjavik was a small town with many limitations, and the extreme instability of the climate was not a good companion, while London and the other European cities were living dramatic times of sirens, strafings, black-out and alimentary rationings, the icelandic capital was a safer place than the rest of Europe.
Soldiers distributed quickly to the population some flyers, to expose the situation and clear any doubt; his majesty’s troops were sorry to cause disturbs to the civil population, and they were ready to reduce to the minimum any problem to the locals in the attempt to defend Iceland against the nazis.
Bowering received the officials for a quick briefing and a tour of the city. There were not incidents. The soldiers requisitioned few buses and boats for their needs, but the british authority opened a bank account in the local Icelandic National Bank with a deposit of 2,000 pounds to guarantee the proper compensations. At the German Consulate, Gerlach was found destroying documentation; his complains for diplomatic violations went unheard, and the he and the german staff was taken into custody. Other important buildings were occupated, with the significant exception of the Parliament.

In the course of the day, Colonel Sturges followed his orders: a company was assigned to Reykjavik, while a detachment was addressed to Hjalfiordur, at both side of the entrance of the fjord. Other garrisons were sent to the landing ground of of Kaldadharnes (70 Km east of Reykjavik), Sandseikhjd and Katnagharda (southwest). Other men were assigned to auxiliary services. The contingent was too little to have a real control of the isle, just a bridgehead waiting for reinforcements; the artillery also was scarce and with little ammo supplies. An old seaplane Supermarine Walrus was the only aerial coverage.
When all the transportation was completed and the ships left the island, a sense of isolation spread among the soldiers. That evening Colonel Sturges was received by the Prime Minister Hermann Jònasson and the icelandic government; they presented formal complains about the violation of icelandic neutrality; nevertheless, according large part of icelandic historians, being in presence of british soldiers instead of the nazi ones spread a sense of relief (37).
In the message to the nation, broadcasted via radio, the prime minister invited the icelanders to collaborate with the “hosts”, as they had given solemn guarantee to limit at a minimun every disturbance, as well as full compensation for any damage (38).

“Force Stuges” was fully developed the 14th of May, and a small detachment established in Akureiry, the second largest icelandic city 250 km north east from Reykjavik; the small detachments around Iceland obviusly could not impede a german invasion, but it was intended to have a network of key points for communications and control. In these very first days, enourmous parts of the Iceland were out of any control, and germans could have disembarked totally unseen, specially the eastern coasts; Colonel Sturges simply had not enough men to cover the land.

The day after invasion, every newspaper had its comment and analyses. The Timinn, daily paper of the Progressive Party (at that time leader of the Parliament), was backing the behaviour of the Prime Minister: after the exemples of Danemark and Norway, the policy of neutrality could not be considered a real option, and the Great Britain had to oppose to the rising strenght of the Germany.

The Morgunblaðid, not owned by any party but traditionally in line with the conservatives, admitted that even if every icelanders wanted to live in peace, in such dramatic days it was not possible anymore; the arrival of the british soldiers was a little thing compared to what happened to the rest of Scandinavia.

The same attitude was showed by the Alþidublaðid, daily paper of the social democrats, inviting to population to have patient.

Totally different was the approach of the communist newspaper Þjòðviljinn, which published a vivid attack against the britons entitled “We all protest”: their unsolicited arrival had to be considered an offence to the nation, and every collaboration with them had to be considered a betrayal against the land of the fathers.

According to the chonicles, local population was quite benevolent towards the foreigners, and the englishmen had the sensibility to respect parliamenty symbols and maintaining a low profile. No incidents exceeded verbal provocation by pro-nazi youngs.
The Government adopted a pragmatical line, with dialogue and cooperation insted of a disdaintful closure. In the first meeting of the delegations, both parts after presenting and receiving the complains, analized the situation: Consul Smith repeated that the british mission was a defensive one, and the presence in Iceland had to be intended as transitory, for the war time. The Consul had credential to discuss any economic affair, and also he stressed that the government of Great Britain had no intention of interfere in any internal policy of Iceland.

On the other side of the Ocean, the english Ambassador Lord Lothian informed the United States authority about was happening in Iceland (39). The americans were still on isolation policy, but it is believable to consider that they would have never let the German to come too close the american continent, as in Greenland (a danish possession, with Denmark already in the hand of Hitler) and maybe in Iceland also. So, the british invasion of Iceland was well accepted by the US gorvernment by the person of Secretary of State Cordell Hull.

The effective threat of a German invasion is a subject long discussed by historians. Many english observers thought tha Force Sturges had preceded a German initiative, and some indications seem to support this thesis. As we have seen, in the prewar years, the germans set up many suspicious initiatives, and the position of Iceland in the long run could represent a key point in the region. But, at the present state, there are no evidences of a german military plan for invasion to be at an operative stage.
Approximately 30 years after the events, Donald Bittner had an interview with english general Arthur Willimas. In his memories, Williams reported a dossier made by Intelligence Service: after a lunch of parachitists, a strong garrison of 50,000 germans already in pre-alarm position in facilities along the river Elba would have followed to complete the invasion. So, the british manouvre had to prevent this eventuality (40). Some pubblications of the US Marine Corp found in the archive of the Keflavik base report anecdotes and second hand stories of this tone: an icelandic employee at the German consulate, when giving Gerlach the news about the arrival of the british soldiers, was replied that he was wrong, they were germans, even if in advance of 10 days. (41)

After the English invasion, the Ober Kommando der Wehrmacht worked to a plan of counterattack, called “Ikarus”. Hitler pushed for a counterinvasion, to close the siege of the british isles and undertake another spectacular action, but the military strategists were definitively against such a project. It was not the little english contingent in Iceland to be the problem, but the area itself, as the british had a much stronger presence in the North Atlantic and in the Arctic Ocean: they had important bases in Orkeny and Shetland, and the possession of Faroer Island. The reaction of USA was unforseeble. The risk for Germany, in the case of a blitz, was to set up a far and isolated enclave non defenseble on the long run. The Grand Admiral Eirich Raeder, after an encounter with the Führer in June 1940, made his conclusions: to establish a significative force in Iceland, it would have been necessary to tranfert a great amount of men and supplies, forcing the english naval blockade, to have a chance to upkeep a base in an enemy controlled region. Many german officials, after the war, expressed the opinion that Iceland was an easy target for a rapid action, but extremely fragile without a channel of communication with Germany. Technical impediments were also discussed, but the icelandic option was rejected when two much more important missions were discussed: Operation Sea Lion, for the invasion of England, and Operation Barbarossa, to attack the East Europe and Soviet Union.

After installing anti aircraft artillery, the first marines were replaced the 17th of May, by the 147° infantry brigade (from the 49° division of the Scottish Command): a new garrison of 4.000 men, at the orders of General Lammie. Although in a greater number, the new force had not heavy artillery nor air coverage; part of the troop had to be hosted in tents (because of the shortage of proper accomodation). The image the british force was giving of itself was not much solid, at the eyes of the population, and german radio broadcast tried to raise up tensions (42). However, the british had the advantage of the first move: a german landing in other ports than Reykjavik was considered unprobable, and they were already holding the area, which could be a further reason for not trying the counterinvasion.

Operation Fork, as it was called, proceeded wuth no significant problems; population and police was collaborating with the soldiers, and the communist paper  Þjòðviljinn was one of the few voices against the foreigners.

Note al testo:
 
 
33) L'ammiragliato considerava indispensabile una base aerea e di rifornimento navale nella regione; le isole Faroer seppure anch'esse di una certa importanza, a causa delle ridottissime risorse, non avrebbero potuto far fronte alle esigenze di un contingente militare che poteva assumere dimensioni notevoli.

34) D. Neuchterlein, Iceland Reluctant Ally, Connecticut 1960, p. 23.

35) Diario di guerra riportato da Bittner, The Lion, cit., nel prologo.

36) Articolo non firmato, Offduty in Iceland, in Blackwood's Magazine (periodico), Londra gennaio 1945.

37) Queste considerazioni mi furono espresse dai professori Valur Ingimundarson e Þor Whitehead nel corso di alcune interviste; entrambi si dissero convinti che la pacifica mentalità islandese dell'epoca era molto più incline, se costretta, ad accettare gli inglesi piuttosto che i bellicosi germanici.

38) Le trascrizioni integrali del discorso vennero pubblicate pressocchè da tutti i giornali l'indomani mattina.

39) Lord Lothian venne ricevuto dal governo USA il 10 Maggio, quindi in realtà ne Reykjavik ne Washington ebbero comunicazioni preventive.

40) Bittner, The Lion, cit. p. 15.

41) The United States Marines in Iceland, 1941-1942, ed. US Marine Corp., 1960; aneddoto riportato in una intervista al generale H.R. Paige.

42) Nel rapporto all'ammiragliato britannico del Colonnello Sturges (202/50 del 27 maggio 1940) egli ricorda come la radio tedesca aveva annunciato l'affondamento delle navi trasporto inglesi, che dovevano riportare i suoi uomini in patria, quando queste erano ancora in porto.

43) C. Marks, Armed Guardians: the Allies in the Defence of Iceland durino the WWII, Fort Wayne, 1998.