Storia Islandese / Iceland, History Of

In 1934 elections, the Icelandic Nazi Party collected few votes, and failed in obtaining a parliamentary representation. Nevertheless, it became object of more serious observation. Before dispatching his annual report to British authority, sir Gurney requested to the delegation in Reykjavik a dossier on the party. The local office wrote up a reassuring document: according to that view, the party had little connections with Germany, and based its identity mainly as an anti-denmark force, strongly oriented to indipendence; the few nazi adepts, even with the support of the local german community, had no way to represent a force of any influence.

 

Very different was the tenor of the letters written by Howard Little, at the time journalist of Manchesterd Guardian and language assistent in the University of Reykjavik. From the pages of his newspaper he confirmed the absence of any defence in the Isle, which was a risky condition. According to him, germans living in Iceland were not less than 500 people, most of them young men, strong enough to clear the field and prepare an invasion by an armed force. The Northern Department of the Foreign Office of London made investigations, but found no proofs of Little’s fears. The journalist was labelled as an alarmist (23).
Even if not considered a reliable source of information, this zealous university assistant had the merit to attrac attentions of the english intelligence on the island. In october 1936, the ministry of foreign affairs a dediated diplomatic consulate, assigning John Bowering as the chief of diplomatic mission. London made an act very appreciated by Reykjavik, but also gave proofs af a new attitude towards icelandic affairs.
From 1937 Bowering was in position to dispatch his first dossier about Iceland. His activity was mainly focused in keeping an eye on the germans. Bowering seemed rather skepticals about the presence of german agents in the country, and there was very little possibility to exercise a traditional spying / counterspying activities.
The nazi party and, in general, demostration of sympathy to the German were also kept into observation. The party was small, with some support among the burgeois youth of the capital, but almost unknown in the rest of the country. Anyway, just like Little observed, an unarmed country could be taken with rapidity and easiness.
One month later the Foreign Office intercepted a german plan for the possibly penetration in the Faroer islands (24); the report of the military intelligence was forwarded to the consul, who received also the order to observe and report any act in connection with such a maneuver.
Bowering did not seem particularly alarmed by the situation, and the elections in June 1938 were in line with this view. The left parties obtained a net victory, while the conservative party (the only one who could have any convergence with the nazis) lost 3 seats. The Nazi Party reported a bad results, and remained out of the Parliament (25).
The biennium 1938-39 saw an increment of german initiatives, public or private, to strenghten the ties between the two countries.
In the spring of 1938 a formation of german pilots landed in Iceland, to promote the development of sport aviation. Bowering reported it the 15th june, 1938, as the activity could hide a mission of recognition of the icelandic ground, to find suitable superficies for landings (26). The case of the suicide of a german pilot was a shock, also because, from some investigations, emerged that the pilot was a member od the SS.
In 1939, the president of Icelandic Flight and Glinder Association was visited by an executive of the british foreign ministry. Berlin had been shown too generous with their icelandic partners, offering them pilots and personnel for flight lessons, free of any charge; this offer seemed suspicious in London. Even if the president of the flying club stressed that there were no political implications, it was clear that the germans had established a relation of frendship and collaboration (among other things, the civil servant noted that the club was receiving regularly the german magazines Luftwelt and Luftreise).

Sport of a field deeply used by the germans for their introduction in the social life of icelanders. 20th october 1938 the Morgunblaðid daily (main newspaper, conservative oriented), published an interview with Gisli Sigurbiornson, leader of the german nazi party, who acted as intermediary between the youth sport association of Iceland and the homologous in Germany. Gisli showed all his satisfaction in announcing that two icelandic football team had been invited to a sport tourneè in Germany, with the possibility to repeat the experience the year after, reversing the roles. A german technical staff was also invited for the subsequent summer, to give prestige and competence to the whole football movement.
Visits between the two countries were supported and sponsored. According to figures, in 1936 at least 2000 icelanders visited Germany for the Olympic Games, and in 1938 the german consul in Denmark, Herr Cecil von Renter-Fink came for an official visit, not only in the capital but also in some peripheric centres of no importance at a first sight.
The annual report for 1938 made by the british consulate was still on relaxed position. Bowering considered the german attemp to make an impression of icelandi public opinion failed: it was clear to anyone that the german “friendship” was an interested one.
At the beginning of march 1939 there were rumors of a german interest in granting to Lufhansa a right of aerial transit in Iceland. The icelandic communists, through the pages of their newspaper Þjòðviljinn set up a strong anti-german campaign; moreover, in summer a visit of the german battleship Emdem was scheduled, and the two facts were put in relation.
The answer of the politics was firm. In that period the parliament was able to express a large majority, with the coalition of the Popular Party (which held the leadership), the Conservatives and the Social Democrats, collecting a total of 44 seats. The opposition was represented by three communist members, and two from the Farmer Party (27). In his speech to the Alþing in March 17th 1939, the prime minister Hermann Jònasson confirmed the visit of the German delegation, but he considered all the issue with soft tones. The Germany was a friendly nation, and therefore it did not have to provoke any fear if a cruiser escorted their fishings boats; the government still considered inopportune to grant of any rights to the airplanes of Lufthansa (28).  In that occasion Jònasson also expressed the decision to place under control the scientific researches in the country, which were held by foreigner nations with a great frequency.
The Lufthansa request was therefore turned down: the instability of international situation suggested the Government not to grant any aerial company rights of transit for the moment, also because the start of a national flight company was in the agenda for the subsequent years.
The pro-government press supported decision of that kind, and the visit of the Emdem seemed to have no effect. The communists were even accused to have raised an exaggerated campaign.
Doubtless, the country was enetering an uncertain period: the government was well aware of the European instability, and they knew that England (which made pressures during the Lufthansa negotiation) could not allow german interferences in Iceland. But in the same time the icelanders saw no reasons to irritate a strong continental power on the base of a journalistic campaign, even if the communists were representing themselves as the whatchdogs of the national interest from the foreigner (ironically, things were to change rapidly after a while), matching also the approval of many non communist people.
The Germans seemed to act quite unscrupulously: sailors of the Emdem marched arm in arm with icelandic supporters in the streets, singing nazis marches. London was still passive. The view of Bowering was firm: the germans had little appeal in Iceland, and the icelandic involvement in a continental war seemed unlikely. The weak point was still the lack of defence in the Isle, as a little organized group could be in the position of making a political coup and overthrow the institutions; keeping under observation the nazi party could not be sufficient.  

I the last years of peace, german activities took the form of scientific researches, in the field of geology, meteo and antropology. The increment of these expeditions conviced the government to the opportunity of making a law to supervise them; every expedition needed a special approval and an appropriate  icelandic institution. The reason for such an act was not only a scientific supervision, but also the willing to have a deep look to potentially indesidered act, as many proofs seemed to suggest: the danish newspaper “Politiken” in Febrary 1939 published an arcticle about the willing of Himmler, the leader of SS, to launch a scientific research to investigate the connection between the german population and the vikings. The same year, in October, in the cultural exposition of Libniz, the organization presented to visitors a pavillion about the life and culture of Iceland, in the “Deusche Kulturpolitische Gesellschaft und Insitut fur Auslandkunde” area of the exposition. In the pavillion, many arcticles and representations stressed with the presumed purity on the icelandic race, and that was a fact of great interest for the nazi ideologists (29).
In march 1939 the british admiralty received a dossier, signed by professor William Tennant of the Queen's College of Cambridge, from a recent trip to Iceland. He said to have been quite confused by what he saw, in reference to the german expedition. The german teams, at his eyes, seemed to be not qualified for an anthopologic research. And, moreover, even if it was well known to everybody that the centre of icelandic activities for centuries was in the south and in the capital region, the team he saw was addressed in the west region, rich of deep fjords and natural ports. He was also disconcerned by another experience: while he was travelling in the north and in the west, often local people asked wheter he was a german cartographer (30).
The german consulate was also object of attention by the britons. At that time, the collegue of Bowering was professor Timmerman, doctor in ornithology; a quite man in the cal atmosphere of Reykjavik, and never seemed a dangerous person. But, in May 1939, his post was assigned to Werner Gerlach, a more active spirit, sent to the island bearing the prestigious title of general consul. The military intelligence and the english embassy in Berlin soon edited a full dossier about. Gerlach was a professor in pathology at the Swiss university of Basel, till his exclusion from the teaching by a resolution of the cantonal government for subversive activities of nazi imprinting. The trial resolved in acquittal, but he moved to Berlin. London was also sure that Gerlach, in a recent part, was also a german agent in the consulate of Zurich, according to the evidence of many british collegues working in the local university.
Bowering had a new, more zealous collegue, in the diplomatic life of the icelandic capital. In 1939, mr. F. Gage, of the Northern Department, officially in holidays in Iceland, met many icelandic personalities; teachers and also ministers were considering Gerlach a pleasant and active person, often involved in the academic society, who seemed very successfull in concentrating the german community under a wide range of activities in the consulate; Gerlach was also reported as a curious traveller in many part Iceland (31).
During the pre-war period, trading manouvers were also implemented by Berlin. England seemed not in the position to arrest the increment of icelandic importation from Germany, and a subsequent economci dependence. This situation had its reason: the tipycal products of Iceland for exportation, like fisheries and ovines, were often in competition with english products, so the Britain could not absorbe over a certain limit. The chronic icelandic weakness got also worste with the Spanish Civil War and the closure of that market, and the German was in the position to take a significant advantage. The commerce of Germany with Denmark and Iceland arised, and during 1935 and 1938 the german expenses in icelandic products doubled.

England was still the first ecomonic partner of Iceland for all ‘30, but the German trading sector was more diversified: if England had the leadership in naval equipments, goods provided by Germany were of common use, like construction materials, medicines and electrics.
Berlin showed great shrewdness in a series of three different commercial agreement in 1937, 1938 and in 1939, to express vitality and force of will with their icelandic partners. All the agrrements were about the purchase of fishery stock by Germany. The first agreement was fairly favourable to Icelanders, but excluding frozen and canned fish. Second agrrement was a little worst in condition for Icelander. Finally, the last one was even more favourable than the first, including also the fishing products which were at that time excluded for trading. This “elastic commercial attitude” was implemented when England was not in position to increase its commerce with Reykjavik.
Any icelander with a bit of common sense knew that the German generousity was hidding the clear interest of making a tie between the countries, and even first minister Hermann Jònasson, in his meeting with Gage above mentioned, considered somehow offensive the behaviour of the Germans, but also expresses the fear that England could do very little about it.
The trading policy of London, inspired by liberalism, was reluctant in granting any special privilege, even if following the German example could bring some advantages. At a first sight, the challenge posed by the germans could be counterattacked by the same meanings: an active and influent consulate, infiltrations in the univesity, fair trading agreements, maybe the establishing of an aerial services between the countries or the help in infrastructure building, could be expensives but usefull. But the english politics were not pushed by the temporary circumstances, and rejected that road map on the base of a simple consideration: even if Germany could establish good trading relations and have its influence in Iceland, in a condition of crisis or war the Royal Navy (the most powerfull european fleet) was to cut those ties.
In the period between September 1939, at the break of the war, and May 1940 (the british invasion), situation remained unchanged. Gerlack kept on serving in Reykjavik, while military visits of any kind were stopped.
The german victories in Europe obviously pushed the British Admiralty on alarmed positions, as the troops of Hitler were gaining a position of supremacy. Thus London decised to impose to Reykjavik kind of a “forced collaboration” with some unquestionable points: stop to any contact with Germany, in trading as well as in scientific fields. The Royal Navy was operating a naval blockade of Germany, and Iceland was obviously behind the shield. Reykjavik, well aware of the situation, made two requests: England to replace the german supplies and trades to limit at minimum the loss for the country, and that any agreement to be “unformal”, in order not to expose Reykjavik to any direct involvement or the loss of neutrality. London also asked the closure of german diplomatic mission in Iceland, and expulsion from the country of every german, but those last condition were refused by Iceland, as in contradiction with the policy of neutrality.
The icelandic issue was discussed in the Committe of Imperial Defence in june 1939. Any attempt in Iceland made by Germany had to be considered as very dangerous, as it could be a move for the siege of the British Isles. But it was also obvious that a complete rethinking of anglo-icelandic relationship had to be made. The weakness of icelandic economy could not stand the loss of a vital trading partner as Germany. Between october and december 1939 many informal meetings were held: the icelandic delegation asked to mantain commerce with Germany to a fixed rate, while incresing the ones with other scandinavian countries. The british firmly rejected the first point, as every contact with Germany was not allowed, but the delegations agred in improving interscandinavian trading and also non-strategic trades with Belgium, Holland, Switzerland and also Italy, with the possibility to open new business channels to USA, other american republics, Spain, Portugal and other nations, to be determined by joint commission (29 december 1939).
Great Bitain had to accept the opening of the markets to importation of meat and fish, and to supply the Iceland for the share previously granted by Germany (which amounted, for Iceland, to 46% of the need of iron and steel and 52% of chemicals).
The agreements represented the new condition of icelandic economy during the british blockade. Even if they were made as joint decision, soon Iceland understood that the “unofficial” label was to be of little defence against the irritation of Germany. The government protested officially the 6th of January 1940; this reaction was expected (as it was discussed at the War Cabinet 3 days before), and the british officials could made a real coup the teatre: Lord Halifax suggested the possibility to present the Icelandic government all guarantee by the King that the icelandic boats were under the protection of the Royal Navy and that Britain was ready to protect Iceland in case of invasion. This note, delivered the 17th of january, left the icelanders speechless, as it moved far beyond the initial intentions all the question, as they never intended to request any military protection.
From the first days of January 1940 to May of the same year (date of the british occupation), every sector of the intelligence services expressed the opinion tha Iceland and Faroer Islands could represent a deadly danger in the hand of the enemy and, in case of german occupation of Scandinavia, establishing bases in Iceland was necessary. As known, the events followed that path, and in April 1940 german troops marched against Denmark and Norway. The german victory in Scandinavia also imposed the shift of the british blockade to the north west.
When Hitler gave the order to invade Denmark and Norway, the shock was remarkable; Iceland was still a danish colony, and the possibility to follow the destiny of other scandinavians was real. The columns of the conservative newspaper Morgunblaðid published a comment titled “the fatal hour” that same 10 april: the neutrality policy showed itself as a nonsense, because it could not grant protection to anybody. The communist Þjòðviljinn, on the contrary, denounced the british intervention in Faroer, claiming them to be the real menace to icelandic security, and asked how long before noticing the british ship at the horizon.